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California Local Initiatives and
Referenda: An Argument For Keeping
the Progressive Flame Burning
Patrick J. Borchers*
INTRODUCTION
Initiatives and referenda are an ingrained part of California polit-
ical history .and culture.' Born of the Progressive movement of the
early twentieth century, direct democracy in many states, including
California, is an enduring political concept.
2
Broadly defined, initiative is the power of the electorate to legislate
or amend the state constitution directly by collecting the signatures
of a sufficient number of registered voters on a petition.3 With some
* Associate, Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer; J.D. 1986, University of California,
Davis; B.S., 1983, University of Notre Dame. Copyright 1989, Patrick J. Borchers. I wish to
thank Cynthia Hoffman and Rita Kapoor for their tireless word-processing. I also wish to
thank Judy Borchers for her editing skills. This article is dedicated to Don Miller, the greatest
local rabble-rouser I have ever met.
1. Lee, The Initiative and Referendum: How California Has Fared, 68 NAT'L Cmvic REV.
69, 69 (1979).
2. See Price, The Initiative: A Comparative State Analysis of a Western Phenomenon,
28 W. POL. Q. 243, 243-45 (1975); Note, New Limits on the California Initiative: An Analysis
and Critique, 19 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. 1045, 1049-50 (1986).
3. Comment, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L.
REv. 922, 925-27 (1975) [hereafter Comment, California Initiative]. The necessary number of
signatures varies from state to state. See Price, supra note 2, at 246-47. In California, a
statewide initiative requires the signatures of five percent of the voters casting votes in the last
gubernatorial race to qualify legislation for the ballot, eight percent to qualify a constitutional
amendment. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. Initiatives to place a county ordinance on a county
ballot require the signatures of ten percent of the voters in the last gubernatorial race within
the county's jurisdiction. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3711 (Vest Supp. 1989). Initiatives to place an
ordinance on a city ballot require the signatures of ten percent of the registered voters within
the city. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4011 (West Siipp. 1989).
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rare exceptions, 4 if a petition drive collects enough signatures, the
measure is placed on the ballot and requires a simple majority of
the votes to become law.5 Referendum is the power of the electorate
to refer legislation to itself for approval or disapproval after enact-
ment by a legislative body. 6 If a referendum petition receives sufficient
signatures within a set time after passage of the legislation, the
referred legislation becomes law only if approved by a majority of
the voters casting ballots in the referendum election.8 The California
Constitution guarantees the right of initiative and referendum, both
locally and statewide. 9 The Constitution speaks of initiative and
referendum not as powers granted to the people, but rather as powers
"reserved" by the people, 0 terminology that courts have found
significant."
Part I of this article reviews the history and development of the
right of local initiative and referendum from its roots in the Pro-
gressive movement to the beginning of this decade. In Part II, the
article assesses and discusses three important new limitations on
California local ballot measures: preemption by state law, invalidity
because of conflicts with local "general plans," and exclusive dele-
gation to the local legislative body. Part III assesses the available
empirical data on the effect of direct democracy on local political
policy and the desirability of limiting the availability of local initia-
tives and referenda.
This article evaluates the trend of recent decisional law in California
with regard to local initiatives and referenda. Despite the constitu-
4. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b) (two-thirds majority necessary to increase
the bonded indebtedness of any local entity).
5. See Comment, California Initiative, supra note 3, at 925.
6. See Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 CALP.
L. Rnv. 1717, 1721 (1966) [hereafter Comment, Scope].
7. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9 (California state-wide referenda require the signatures
of five percent of the voters in the last gubernatorial race, and must be collected within ninety
days of enactment); CAL. Ernc. CoDE § 4051 (West Supp. 1989) (ten percent of registered
voters within a city must sign a referendum petition within thirty days passage by the city
council in order to refer an ordinance).
8. See Comment, Scope, supra note 6, at 1721.
9. See CAL. CoNsT. art. II, §§ 8-9, 11; art. IV, § 1.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Associated Home
Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d
473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, (1976) ("Drafted in light of the theory that all governmental authority
ultimately resides in the people, the amendment speaks of the initiative and referendum, not
as a right granted the people, but as a power reserved by them."). Cf. Bell, The Referendum:
Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. Rv. 1, 15 (1978) (terming the distinction
a "fiction").
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tional status of the right of local direct democracy, recent decisions
have imposed new and substantial limitations on that right. 12 This
article argues that these limitations are at odds with the historical
roots of direct democracy, are doctrinally unsound and are unwise
from a policy perspective.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOCAL INITATIVE AND REFERENDUM
IN CALnIORmA
A. Progressive Roots
Although it can be traced to ancient Greece and New England
town meetings, 13 direct democracy made a significant impact in
America in the early twentieth century as part of a package of
Progressive reforms. 14 In 1898, South Dakota became the first state
to embrace the statewide popular initiative. 5 Since that time, nearly
half of the states have adopted some type of plebiscite mechanism.1
6
Reformist sentiment sweeping the country came to California in
the early 1900's. 17 At that time the Southern Pacific Railroad dom-
inated, corrupted and bribed the state legislature, and all of California
politics, to the exclusion of all other interests. 8 Popular frustration
12. See infra notes 74-158 and accompanying text.
13. Brostoff, Direct Democracy Makes Increasingly Good Sense, 10 L. A. LAW. 64, 64
(June 1987).
14. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIOsrNA, INrTiATIvE AND RE ERENDum IN
CALIFORNIA A LEGACY LOST? A STUDY OF DIRECT LEGISLATION IN CALIFORNIA FROi PROGRESSIVE
HoPEs TO PRESENT REALrrY (1984); CAL. SEc'y OF STATE MARCH FONG Eu, A HISTORY OF
THE CALnORIA ITIAvE PRoCESS (updated annually); Ertukel, Debating Initiative Reform:
A Summary of the Second Annual Symposium on Elections at the Center for the Study of
Law and Politics, 2 J. LAW AND POLITICS 313, 313 (1987); Lowenstein, Campaign Spending
and Ballot Propositions, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 507-08 (1982); Price, supra note 2, at 243
n.2; Sirico, The Constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IowA L. Rev, 637, 638
(1980); Zimmerman, The Initiative and Referendum: A Threat to Representative Government,
8 URBAN L. AND POL'Y 219, 221 (1987); Comment, Scope, supra note 6, at 1717. See generally
D. MAGELBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION (1984); L. TALLION, AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF TH-E
InmTn7AT, REFERENDtIU AND RECALL PROCESS (1977); J. NAIsBTrr, MEGATRENDS: THE NEW
DIRECTIONS TRANSFORMING OUR LivEs, 164-75 (1982) (discussing the effect of shifts from
representative democracy to direct democracy).
15. Lowe, Restrictions on Initiative and Referendum Powers in South Dakota, 28 S.D.L.
REv. 53 (1982); Sirico, supra note 14, at 638; Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 220.
16. Allen, The National Initiative: A Preliminary Analysis, 58 NEB. L. Rev. 965, 1007
(1979); Sirico, supra note 14, at 638.
17. B. HYINi, S. BROWN & E. THACKER, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA at
61 (9th ed. 1975) (hereafter B. HYINK). See generally M. WEATHERSON, HILAMS JOHNSON: A
BIO-BmLIOGRAPHY (1988).
18. B. HYINx, supra note 17, at 62.
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with Southern Pacific hit the boiling point in reaction to the railroad's
bullying of the 1906 California Republican Convention.19 Shortly
thereafter, breakaway Republicans formed the "Lincoln-Roosevelt"
league.20 The League successfully sponsored the Direct Primary Act,
which required political parties to nominate their candidates based
upon the popular vote in a primary election, instead of through a
state party convention.21
Encouraged by the possibility of nominating a Republican who
was not a puppet of the railroad interests, the League began searching
for appealing candidates. 22 The League finally succeeded in drafting
a reluctant young lawyer named Hiram Johnson.23 Johnson was a
San Francisco prosecutor, and had prosecuted successfully famous
political boss Abe Ruef on a charge of bribing a San Francisco
County Supervisor. 24 Johnson's major campaign promise was to
"kick the Southern Pacific Railroad out of the Republican Party
and out of State Government." 25
Aided by the inability of the old guard Republicans to settle on a
single candidate, Johnson captured the Republican gubernatorial
primary with almost fifty percent of the votes. 26 Aided by a strong
Socialist third-party candidate, who siphoned almost fifteen percent
of the general election votes from the Democratic candidate, Johnson
captured the general election in November of 1910.27 League Repub-
licans also won majorities in both houses of the legislature. 28
The League Republicans came to power with a broad agenda.
Among their legislative innovations during Johnson's first term were
women's suffrage in state elections, shorter work days, workers'
compensation, investment Blue Sky laws and statutes prohibiting
political corruption. 29 No reform, however, was as essential to the
19. Id.
20. Id. See also H. JoHNsoN, I DMY LETTEmS or HIRAm JoHNsoN at 9-10 (R. Burke ed.
1983) (hereafter H. JomsoN).
21. B. HymNK, supra note 17, at 62; H. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 10.
22. H. JoHNsoN, supra note 20, at 10.
23. Id.
24. B. HYINI, supra note 17, at 62; H. JoHNsoN, supra note 20, at 9. This was one of
the most eventful episodes in California political history. The San Francisco graft prosecutions
included repeated attempts to bribe witnesses and juries and the murder of a prosecutor in
the San Francisco County Superior Courthouse. See generally F. HicHEoRN, THE SYsTEm
(1915).
25. B. Hym, supra note 17, at 67.
26. H. JoHNsoN, supra note 20, at 10-11.
27. Id. at 12.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 14-15.
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Progressive agenda as the direct democracy trilogy: recall, referendum
and initiative. In his first inaugural address Johnson declared:
And while I do not by any means believe the Initiative, the Ref-
erendum, and the Recall are the panacea for our political ills, yet
they do give the electorate the power of action when desired, and




In a 1911 special election, the League-dominated state legislature
put before the voters a measure to amend the state constitution to
add provisions for these reforms. 31 By a three to one margin, the
voters approved the amendment. 32 Perhaps because they carried out
so much of their agenda in the four years spanning Johnson's first
term as governor, the Progressives quickly passed the zenith of their
influence in California. In 1912 the newly-formed national Progres-
sive Party, popularly known as the "Bull Moose" Party, nominated
Theodore Roosevelt as its presidential candidate, and Governor John-
son as its vice-presidential candidate.3 3 Roosevelt and Johnson ran
strongly despite their third party status, but charismatic Democratic
nominee Woodrow Wilson won a majority of the electoral votes.
34
Johnson was re-elected to the statehouse in 1914, but resigned in
1916 to run successfully for the United States Senate, where he served
until his death three decades later.
35
The great legacy of Johnson and the Progressives was the reduction
of the distorting and un-democratic influences of corruption and big
business on State and local government in California. One of their
methods was to link more directly popular sentiment and political
policy through women's suffrage, recall, referendum, initiative, direct
primaries, and allowing political candidates to "cross-file" and thereby
run in more than one political primary.36 Two of the monuments
that the Progressives left on the political landscape of California
were the referendum and the initiative. Thus, the recent battles over
the scope of local initiatives and referenda, 37 are, as one commentator
concluded recently, battles to determine how long of a shadow Hiram
30. F. HicimoaN, STORY OF TIM SESSIoN OF THE CAIFoRNuIA LEGISLATURE oF 1911 at 93
n.115 (1911) (quoting the Jan. 4, 1911 inaugural address of Governor Johnson).
31. H. JoHNsoN, supra note 20, at 14.
32. Id.
33. B. HyiNK, supra note 17, at 64.
34. Id.
35. H. JoHNsoN, supra note 20, at 19.
36. Id. at 13-15.
37. See infra notes 78-158 and accompanying text.
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Johnson continues to cast over California politics.3" Through the
early 1980's, the Governor's shadow was long indeed.
B. Case law Development
From their inception, initiatives and referenda have been devices
for short-circuiting representative government. In order to function
effectively, these powers needed to be at least roughly co-extensive
with the legislative authority of the governing body. Accordingly,
the 1911 constitutional amendments were drafted broadly, containing
few restrictions. The only express limit on the substance of an
initiated law or constitutional amendment is that it may not "em-
brac[e] more than one subject." 39 The only express limitation on the
substance of a referendum is that it does not apply to urgency
measures, legislation "calling elections . . ., providing for tax levies
or appropriations for usual current expenses . . . . ,4
Beyond these limits, courts acting in the wake of the 1911 amend-
ments generally took the view that initiatives and referenda could
reach as far as the authority of the legislative body; therefore, state
initiatives could reach to the limits of state authority, local initiatives
to the limits of local authority. 41 Accordingly, popularly-initiated
legislation obviously does not have the power to override the federal
constitution, or other strictures that apply equally to acts of the
legislative body.
42
38. Fulton, Ballot Box Zoning, CAL. LAW. 42, 45 (May, 1988) ("if [a local growth control
initiative is struck down], it will seem to the proponents of slow growth that Hiram Johnson's
shadow is very short indeed.").
39. CAL. CoNsr. art. II, § 8 (former art. IV, § I (added 1911)). See also California Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, Inc. v. Eu, 200 Cal. App. 3d 351, 360-61, 245 Cal. Rptr. 916, 921-22 (1988)
(insurance initiative may not be submitted to voters because it violates the single subject rule).
See generally Eastman, Squelching Vox Populi: Judicial Review of the Initiative in California,
25 S TA CtARA L. Rav. 529, 538-43 (1985) (discussing the availability of pre-election
injunctions); Comment, Pre-election Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative in Voter Protection,
71 CAI.F. L. REv. 1216, 1226-27 (1983) (discussing the availability of pre-election injunctions).
40. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9 (formerly art. IV, § 1 (added 1911)). See also Geiger v.
Board of Supervisors, 48 Cal. 2d 832, 837, 313 P.2d 545, 547 (1957) (referendum of a county
sales and use tax not available).
41. See, e.g., Hunt v. City of Riverside, 31 Cal. 2d 619, 628, 191 P.2d 426, 431 (1948);
Martin v. Smith, 176 Cal. App. 2d 115, 117, 1 Cal. Rptr. 307, 547 (1959); Ley v. Dominguez,
212 Cal. 587, 593, 299 P. 713, 715 (1931); McClure v. Nye, 22 Cal. App. 248, 251, 133 P.
1145, 1147 (1913).
42. See Comment, Scope, supra note 6, at 1724-25. See generally Borchers & Dauer,
Taming the New Breed of Nuclear Free Zone Ordinances: Statutory and Constitutional
Infirmities in Local Procurement Ordinances Blacklisting the Producers of Nuclear Weapons
Components, 40 HIsrn os L.J. 87 (1988) (arguing that certain types of nuclear local free zone
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The primary judicially-created limit on popular enactments re-
stricted them to "legislative" actions, as opposed to "administrative"
or "judicial" actions.43 The animating principle behind this distinction
was the courts' belief that popular enactments should be restricted
to fairly broad declarations of policy. 44 In essence, the courts declared
a "one-bite-at-the-apple" rule. In order to avoid undue interference
with governmental functions, the electorate must act at the time when
the fundamental policy is set, not at a later time when the local
entity has passed the point of no return in implementing the already-
declared policy.
45
The other substantial limitation on the use of local popular enact-
ments was announced in Hurst v. City of Burlingame." In Hurst,
the California Supreme Court struck down an initiative enacting a
city-wide zoning ordinance. 47 The court reasoned that the initiative
was invalid because it enacted a zoning ordinance without affording
the affected property owners a hearing as required by state law. 4
The court perceived a conflict between zoning law and initiative law,
and resolved the conflict in favor of the zoning statutes because of
their greater specificity.49 The court also suggested in dictum that its
holding was constitutionally-compelled, because failure to afford a
hearing offended procedural due process.50
As a practical matter, Hurst meant that zoning ordinances never
could be the subject of an initiative, because of the impossible
logistics of arranging for a statutory-complaint hearing before the
ultimate decision-maker, the electorate. Hurst also led to the curious
ordinances, many of which are the product of direct democracy, conflict with state statutes
and the federal constitution).
43. See Comment, Scope, supra note 6, at 1734-36. Other states have similar doctrines.
See, e.g., Note, Referendum and Rezoning, Margolis v. District Court, 53 U. Coo. L. REv.
745 (1982); Note, Zoning Initiative and Referendum-Delegation of Powers-A Board of
County Commissioners' Approval of a Planned Unit Development is Legislative Action, Subject
to Referendum; Sufficiently Precise Standards are Required for a Board of County Commis-
sioners to Approve a Final Development Plan, Peachtree Development Co. v. Paul, 67 Ohio
St. 2d, 423 N.E.2d 1081 (1981), 51 U. CN. L. REv. 149 (1982).
44. See, e.g., Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 130-31, 222 P.2d 225, 229 (1950); McKevitt
v. City of Sacramento, 55 Cal. App. 117, 124, 203 P. 132, 136 (1921).
45. See, e.g., Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d at 130-31, 222 P.2d at 228 (initiative ordinance
designating a new site for a court house invalid because county had already entered into
contracts for construction at the new site). See also Comment, Scope, supra note 6, at 1734-
36.
46. 207 Cal. 137, 277 P. 308 (1929).
47. Id. at 140, 227 P. at 311.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 141, 227 P. at 311.
50. Id.
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anomaly that voters could refer, but not initiate, zoning ordinances.5'
The distinction drawn by the Hurst court was that in the case of a
referred zoning ordinance a hearing necessarily had taken place at
the time of enactment by the legislative body.5 2
Beginning in 1974, with three decisions authored by Justice Mat-
thew Tobriner, the California Supreme Court dismantled the Hurst
doctrine, and pushed the scope of local initiatives and referenda to
their outer boundaries.5 3 In San Diego Building Contractors Associ-
ation v. City Council,54 the Court considered the validity of an
initiated zoning ordinance in the City of San Diego. The court upheld
the ordinance, distinguishing Hurst on the grounds that the City of
Burlingame (the defendant in Hurst) was a general law city, and thus
governed by state law procedures for ordinance enactment, while San
Diego was a charter city, and bound only by its charter procedures."
After reviewing the San Diego charter, the court concluded that it
did not require a hearing, or similar procedure, prior to the enactment
of a zoning ordinance. 56 The court also specifically disapproved the
Hurst dictum which implied that due process required notice and a
hearing prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance. 57
In Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City
of Livermore5 8 the court directly overruled Hurst on its holding that
zoning initiatives, in general law cities, required a hearing as man-
dated by statute. At issue in Livermore was an initiative commonly
known as the "SAVE" initiative, which prohibited the issuance of
building permits within the city until local educational, sewage dis-
posal, and water supply facilities met minimum standards.5 9 The
court began from the premise that the SAVE initiative was a zoning
ordinance which, like the ordinance at issue in Hurst, would have
required a statutory notice and hearing if enacted by the city council.6
The court then criticized the incongruity generated by Hurst:
51. See Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 320 (1927).
52. Hurst, 207 Cal. at 142, 227 P. at 313 (In Dwyer "the city council had taken all of
the required preliminary steps in order that the measure might become a valid city ordinance
53. See generally Fulton, supra note 38, at 43 (discussing the three Tobriner decisions).
54. 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 520, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974).
55. Id. at 215-16, 529 P.2d at 526, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
56. Id. at 209, 529 P.2d at 522, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
57. Id. at 216, 529 P.2d at 526-27, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53.
58. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
59. Id. at 588, 557 P.2d at 475, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
60. Id. at 593-94, 557 P.2d at 474-75, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45. The trial court made such
a finding, and the Supreme Court did not question it, perhaps because of its eagerness to
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At first glance it becomes apparent that something must be wrong
with the reasoning in Hurst. Starting from a premise of equality-
that voters possess only the same legislative authority as does the
city council-Hurst arrived at the conclusion that only the council
and not the voters had the authority to enact zoning measures.61
The court concluded that the Hurst court erroneously perceived a
conflict between initiative law and the zoning statutes.6 2 The legisla-
ture intended to apply the procedural requirements governing zoning
ordinance adoption only to city council action, not voter action.
63
The court reasoned that it made no more sense to impose the
procedural framework of city council action on the voters than it
did to impose the procedural framework of voter action on the city
council.64
Finally, and most importantly, the court held that its reading of
the zoning laws was constitutionally-compelled. The Livermore ma-
jority concluded that the Hurst court erred in treating the perceived
conflict between the zoning law and initiative law as "a conflict
between two statutes of equal status. ' 65 This analysis, the court
reasoned, overlooked the fact that the initiative process is a "right
itself guaranteed by the Constitution."6 To the extent that the zoning
statutes conflicted with the right of the electorate to legislate on a
overrule Hurst. Nonetheless, a credible argument could be made that the SAVE initiative was
not a zoning ordinance within the meaning of the Government Code sections cited by the
Supreme Court. The SAVE initiative was a "performance standard" growth control initiative,
requiring the city to solve basic service problems prior to continuing to allow development.
See STANoD ENmomRENTAL LAw SocrY, A HANDBOOK FOR CONTRomN LocAL GROWTH
at 86 (1973); Deutsch, Land Use Growth Controls: A Case Study of San Jose and Livermore,
California, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 14 (1974). Thus, the SAVE initiative did not change
any land-use designations, nor necessarily prevent the issuance of any building permits. In
these respects, the SAVE initiative does not resemble traditional zoning ordinances. This
argument was, in fact, the primary argument made by counsel for the City of Livermore
throughout the litigation. See, Appellants' opening Brief, Assbciated Home Builders of the
Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41
(1976) (authored by Maurice Engel), Appellants' Petition for Hearing By the Supreme Court
of the State of California, Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41
(authored by Maurice Engel). The proponents of the SAVE initiative and the Sierra Club
argued directly and vigorously for the overruling of Hurst. See Brief of Amici Curiae, Save
All Valley Environments, Inc., and the Sierra Club In Support of Defendants and Appellants,
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (authored by Richard J. Fink).
61. Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.
3d 582, 593-94, 557 P.2d 473, 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 47.
62. Id. at 594, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 594, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
66. Id. at 595, 557 P.2d at 481, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (emphasis added).
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footing equal to the city council, the court held that the zoning
statutes were unconstitutional.
6 7
The third case in the Tobriner trilogy was Arnel Development Co.
v. City of Costa Mesa.68 In Arnel a neighborhood association cir-
culated and passed an initiative to rezone sixty-eight acres of land
within the city for single family residential use. 69 The plaintiffs,
owners of the property, argued that the rezoning was not the proper
subject of an initiative; they contended that rezoning is "administra-
tive" or "adjudicatory" in nature, as opposed to legislative.70 The
plaintiffs premised their argument on the assertion that the relatively
small size of the parcel, and the small number of owners, took the
matter outside the scope of legislative action because the action did
not implicate broad policy issues. 71 The court rejected this argument,
holding that the zoning of any parcel, no matter how small, required
the exercise of political judgment characteristic of legislative action,
and thus was appropriate for initiative or referendum. 72 Finally, the
court reiterated its holding in San Diego Building Contractors that
due process did not require a notice or hearing prior to rezoning. 3
These cases represented the high water mark for California local
initiatives and referenda. Since then the tide has ebbed considerably.
II. A NEw ERA OF LRTS
This ebbing tide is most apparent in three areas. The first is the
application of preemption doctrine to initiatives and referenda, the
second is the newly-created requirement of general plan consistency,
and the third is the "exclusive delegation" doctrine.
A. Preemption by the Cortese-Knox Act
California's Cortese-Knox Act74 is a comprehensive and compli-
cated legislative scheme to regulate inter-governmental land-use de-
cisions within each county. The Act provides for a local agency
67. Id.
68. 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980).
69. Id. at 514, 620 P.2d at 567, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
70. Id. at 514, 620 P.2d at 567-68, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
71. Id. at 514-16, 620 P.2d at 567-68, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 906-07.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 521-22, 620 P.2d at 571, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
74. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 56000-57550 (Vest Supp. 1989).
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formation commission, commonly known as a "LAFCO," which has
the exclusive authority within each county to make determinations
on matters such as the planning sphere of cities within the county,
annexations of land to cities, and the incorporation of new cities.
75
In Ferrini v. City of San Luis Obispo,76 the electorate in San Luis
Obispo qualified an initiative that would have prohibited all annex-
ations unless approved by the voters at the next election. 77 Plaintiffs
were landowners who had successfully petitioned LAFCO for annex-
ation. 71 Plaintiffs argued that the forerunner legislation to the Cortese-
Knox Act preempted the initiated legislation.
79
The court of appeal agreed. The court began by noting the com-
prehensive and exclusive nature of the legislation creating LAFCOs. 0
The court concluded that it was "persuaded that the Legislature's
intent to occupy the field ... is clearly established."'" Thus, the
court held the city council would have no power to enact such
legislation, and consequently, because of the coextensive reach of the
electorate and the city council, the initiative was invalid.
2
Ferrini is sound doctrinally, and its holding that the Cortese-Knox
Act has preemptive effect is uncontroversial. 3 Nevertheless, because
of its broad language, Ferrini may have unintended consequences.
The Cortese-Knox Act does not foreclose cities from making any
decisions that affect annexations. For instance, a city council may
assign land-use designations to property within its planning area, but
not yet within the city boundaries. Such decisions may weigh heavily
on a landowner's decision to seek annexation. An effect on annex-
ation, however, should not be interpreted to prevent the initiation
or referral of a land-use designation on property outside a city, but
within the city's planning area. Ferrini simply holds that in cases in
75. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 56325 (West Supp. 1989).
76. 150 Cal. App. 3d 239, 197 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1983).
77. Id. at 242 n.2, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 696 n.2.
78. Id. at 242, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 246, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
82. Id. at 248, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
83. The holding is only uncontroversial if one accepts the premise that the authority of
local electorates and local legislative bodies is co-extensive. A plausible argument can be made
that local electorates ought to have broader authority than local legislative bodies, at least in
the context of overriding state statutes, because of the constitutional foundation of the initiative
and referendum powers. However, no cases have taken this "strong" view of the power of
local electorates to act. Moreover, as this article points out, even the more modest assertion
that local electorates and legislative bodies ought to have equal authority is in jeopardy because
of recent judicial limitations.
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which the city council may not act, the electorate's authority is
circumscribed similarly;84 Ferrini ought not be read more broadly.
Cases in the wake of Ferrini are now making their way up the
appellate ladder.85 The challenge will be to adopt a principled reading
of the preemption doctrine.
B. Consistency With General Plans
Under California law, all general law (non-charter) cities must have
a "general plan." ' 86 A general plan is a comprehensive planning
document, which can be amended by a majority vote of the city
council.8 7 Zoning, and other planning ordinances, must be consistent
with the general plan.
88
Recent case law has created a new requirement that initiatives and
referenda conform to general plans. In deBottari v. Norco City
Council,89 a landowner applied to the city council for a general plan
and zoning change, both of which were granted. 90 The general plan
amendment was approved a mere two weeks before the zoning
change. 9' Following the zoning change, voters collected sufficient
signatures on a petition to refer the zoning ordinance. 92 The city
council refused to repeal the ordinance or call for an election, arguing
that either action risked having a zoning ordinance inconsistent with
the general plan. 93
Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the city council
to repeal the zoning change or call for an election; the trial court
denied the writ and the court of appeal affirmed. The court of appeal
reasoned that general plan and ordinance consistency is the "linchpin
of California's land use and development laws . . . . 94 Further, the
court referred to what it termed the "immutable effect" of the
general plan,95 and its "constitutional" nature with respect to land-
84. Ferrini, 150 Cal. App. 3d 239, 248, 197 Cal. Rptr. 694, 700.
85. See, e.g., Fulton, supra note 38, at 45.
86. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (Vest Supp. 1989).
87. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65300 (West Supp. 1989).
88. See, e.g., id. §§ 65860, 66473.5 (West Supp. 1989).
89. 171 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1985).
90. Id. at 1207, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
91. Id. at 1207-08, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
92. Id. at 1208, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1213, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
95. Id. at 1211, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 794 (quoting Note, General Plans, 26 HAsTNos L.
614, 622 (1974)).
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use decisions.96 Accordingly, the court concluded "that the referen-
dum, if successful, would enact a clearly invalid zoning ordinance. ' 97
It does not take an especially acute ear to hear echoes of the
discredited Hurst doctrine in deBottari's analysis. 98 Just as the Hurst
doctrine imposed statutory strictures on the electorate, with which
the electorate could not comply, so does the deBottari doctrine. The
deBottari court went out of its way to create the impression that
general plans are "sacred," "immutable," or equivalent to the
Constitution. The record belies the truth. The landowner in deBottari
sought and received the general plan change only two weeks before
the zoning change. 99 City councils generally view the change of land-
use designations within general plans as little more than a precursor
to zoning changes, and the Norco City Council appears to be no
exception to the rule.
Moreover, the suggestion that general plans are "immutable," in
the sense that the Constitution is immutable, is flatly wrong. As the
court itself recognized, general plans may be, and are, amended
several times per year upon a simple majority vote of the city
council.' °° The court's suggestion that the referendum sought to enact
an ordinance inconsistent with the general plan is equally erroneous.
Quite to the contrary, the city council did the only "enacting;" the
referendum proponents sought only to preserve the status quo.
The rule announced in deBottari is little more than an effort to
throw statutory roadblocks in the way of the electorate's ability to
affect land use decisions. In Livermore, the California Supreme Court
rejected such a reading of the state's planning laws as implausible
and unconstitutional.10 1 Perhaps because of these infirmities, de-
Bottari apparently is not meeting with universal acceptance.
Recently, a Los Angeles Superior Court judge refused to follow
deBottari, concluding that a city council could correct inconsistencies
96. Id. at 1212, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
97. Id. at 1213, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
98. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
99. 171 Cal. App. 3d at 1208, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
100. Id. at 1213, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 795 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65361 (West Supp.
1989)).
101. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text. To make the absurdity complete, the
deBottari decision amounts to little more than an insistence that the referendum proponents
simply picked the wrong enactment to referend. The general plan change clearly is a decision
subject to referendum. See, e.g., Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 685 P.2d 1152, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 801 (1984). Under the deBottari rule, the referendum, had it been directed at the general
plan, would have controlled over the inconsistent zoning ordinance.
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between a general plan and zoning ordinances in a reasonable time.102
Even more recently, a court of appeals' decision purported to distin-
guish deBottari. In Building Industry Association of San Diego v.
Superior Court,10 3 a homebuilders trade association sought to inval-
idate an initiative setting numerical growth limits. The homebuilders
made a two-pronged attack on the ordinance. First, they argued that
it violated state statutes requiring all cities to accept their "fair
share" of low and moderate income housing; second, they argued
that the ordinance conflicted with the city of Oceanside's general
plan. 104 The court of appeal agreed with the trial court's decision
denying summary judgment to both sides.105 The court concluded
that the "fair share" issue presented factual issues requiring a trial. 06
However, the court suggested that conflict with the city's general
plan was not sufficient to invalidate the ordinance. 0 7 Reviewing the
case and statutory authority, the court concluded that "[a] declaration
of invalidity of the ordinance is not a prescribed remedy" for
inconsistency within the general plan. 0 8 In the final paragraph of the
opinion, the court distinguished deBottari:
The basic factual situation in deBottari was that a repeal of the
zoning ordinance there involved, if placed on the ballot as a
referendum measure, would result in the subject property being
zoned for the low density residential use while the amended general
plan calls for higher residential density. Thus, in deBottari the court
was concerned with a clear, immediate inconsistency between the
zoning ordinance repeal which was the subject of the referendum,
if adopted, and the amended general plan, resulting in the trial and
appellate courts' refusing to order the referendum placed on the
ballot. Since no such clear, immediate inconsistency between [the
growth control initiative] and the [Oceanside] general plan is in-
volved here, deBottari furnishes no authority for invalidating [the
initiative]. 109
This distinction is entirely unconvincing. deBottari simply an-
nounced a broad rule invalidating zoning initiatives and referenda
inconsistent with general plans. Neither the clarity nor the immediacy
102. Fulton, supra note 38, at 45.
103. 211 Cal. App. 3d 277, 259 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1989).
104. Id. at 280, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
105. Id. at 298, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
106. Id. at 293-94, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
107. Id. at 297, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 297-98, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
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of the conflict figured in the rationale. Building Industry, however,
endorses the more sensible and constitutionally-sound rule that gen-
eral plans may be brought into harmony with initiatives and referenda
after the electorate has acted. Neither the clarity nor the immediacy
of the conflict is or ought to be a factor. The Building Industry
court was on the right track; it should have completed its journey
by expressly disagreeing with deBottari.
Thus the ultimate influence of the deBottari analysis remains an
open question. In any event, deBottari represents a significant retreat
from the philosophy evidenced in Livermore and the other decisions
of the 1970's, and announces a pernicious doctrine if widely followed.
C. Exclusive Delegation
The California Supreme Court recently imposed the most signifi-
cant restriction on local initiatives and referenda. In Committee of
Seven Thousand v. Superior Court, °10 the California Supreme Court
considered the initiative petition of a local citizens group, the Com-
mittee of Seven thousand ("COST"), to prohibit the City of Irvine
from imposing any development fees to finance three superhighways,
without first submitting the matter to the voters."' California Gov-
ernment Code section 66484.3 specifically allowed, but did not re-
quire, Orange County citieg, such as Irvine, to impose such fees.
112
The section's plain language merely gave them the option:
the board of supervisors of the County of Orange and the city
council of any city in that county may, by ordinance, require the
payment of a fee ... for purposes of defraying the actual or
estimated costs of ... constructing major thoroughfares." 3
The court began by seizing upon the language of section 66484.3,
which spoke only of "the board of supervisors" and "the city
council" as having the authority to decide whether such fees were
desirable. 14 If the legislature specifically intended to allow only the
legislative bodies of local entities to make these decisions, the court
reasoned, then the statute precluded an initiative on the same topic. 15
110. 45 Cal. 3d 491, 754 P.2d 708, 247 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1988).
111. Id. at 495, 754 P.2d at 709, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
112. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66484.3 (West Supp. 1989).
113. Committee of Seven Thousand, 45 Cal. 3d at 501, 754 P.2d at 713, 247 Cal. Rptr.
at 367 (quoting California Gov't Code section 66484.3 (emphasis added)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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The court interpreted past decisions as requiring a strong inference
of legislative intent to exclude popular action in cases in which the
legislation specifically names the governing body, such the "board
of supervisors" or "city council," as opposed to a more generic
statutory reference, such as "governing body.""' 6 The court further
reasoned that past decisions gave the legislature greater authority to
exclude popular action in matters of "statewide concern."1 7 The
court concluded that because transportation was an issue of "state-
wide concern," and section 66484.3 made a "specific" reference to
the legislative bodies of local entities, the legislature intended to
preclude popular action, such as the COST initiative." 8
Turning to the constitutional" 9 issue, the court concluded that
section 66484.3, read as an exclusive delegation of authority to the
city council, did not violate the constitutional guarantee of initiative
and referendum. The court's discussion of the constitutional impli-
cations of this interpretation of section 66484.3 consisted primarily
of an attempt to distinguish Livermore. 20 The court concluded that
zoning, the issue in Livermore, was primarily a matter of municipal,
as opposed to statewide, concern, and that "comments in that case
must be read in that context."'' The court also cited Ferrini, and
other preemption cases for the proposition that the legislature can
limit local action, but did not appear to draw the conclusion that
section 66484.3, or its companion statutes, were sufficiently pervasive
to occupy the field in the same fashion as the Cortese-Knox Act. 22
116. Id. ("Review of the caselaw further suggests that the strength of the inference [of
legislative intent to exclude popular action] varies according to the precise language used in
the statute, a reference using generic language such as 'governing body' or 'legislative body'
supporting a weaker inference than a specific reference to 'boards of supervisors' and 'city
councils."').
117. Id. at 505, 754 P.2d at 715, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 369 ("[The distinction between municipal
affairs and statewide concerns] is an important factor in ascertaining legislative intent ... ").
118. Id. at 509, 754 P.2d at 719, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
119. Article II, section 11, of the California Constitution appears to exclude specifically
charter cities, such as Irvine, from the scope of the right to initiative and referendum. However,
it is settled law in California that all cities and counties are under the same constitutional
obligation to allow initiatives and referenda, regardless of their status as charter or general
law. See, e.g., Community Health Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 146 Cal. App. 3d 990, 194
Cal. Rptr. 557 (1983); Atlas Hotels, Inc. v. Acker, 230 Cal. App. 2d 658, 41 Cal. Rptr. 231
(1964). Both the majority and the dissent in Committee of Seven Thousand assumed this
premise, and discussed Livermore and other general law city precedents as if they were fully
applicable in the charter city context.
120. Committee of Seven Thousand, 45 Cal. 3d at 510-11, 754 P.2d at 720-21, 247 Cal.
Rptr. at 374-75.
121. Id. at 511, 754 P.2d at 720, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
122. Id.
1989 / California Local Initiatives and Referenda
Finally, the court rejected COST's suggestion that state delegation
to the legislative bodies of local entities was appropriate only in the
context of regulation sufficiently pervasive to preempt. 23 COST
argued that "exclusive delegation" was possible only in cases in
which the state occupied the field, thereby converting the local
legislative body into an administrative agency of the state.'24 The
Court rejected the "administrative" and "legislative" terminology as
"awkward and confusing."' The correct test, the court held, was
simply whether the legislature evidenced an intent to exclude popular
action. 26 If the legislature evidenced such an intent, and was acting
in an area of statewide concern, initiatives and referenda are barred.127
Justice Mosk, writing alone, dissented vigorously.1 28 Justice Mosk
sharply criticized the majority for abandoning the rule of resolving
doubts in favor of popular action. 129 Justice Mosk also argued that
the majority's test lacked analytical foundation, and that it ignored
the constitutional status of the right of referendum. 30 His dissent
reasoned that an exclusive delegation occurs only if the legislature
acted to remove all discretion from the local entity, thus making the
local entity's legislative body an administrative vehicle for carrying
out a pre-ordained state policy.13' Justice Mosk pointed out the
relevant statute, Government Code section 66484.3, "evidenced ...
no policy," but rather gave unfettered discretion to impose or not
to impose development fees. 32 Accordingly, Justice Mosk would have
ordered the measure placed on the ballot.1
33
Even a brief review reveals that there is something wrong with the
majority's analysis. The right of local initiative and referendum is a
right of constitutional dimension. Yet the majority held that in all
issues of "statewide" concern, the legislature may abrogate this right
simply by evincing an intent to do so. Constitutional rights, however,
act as a check on legislative action, not the other way around. The




126. Id. at 513, 754 P.2d at 721, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 513, 754 P.2d at 721, 247 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 513, 754 P.2d at 722, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 516, 754 P.2d at 728, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 518, 754 P.2d at 730, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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inconsistent with the constitutional right of local initiative and ref-
erendum is invalid. The doctrine announced by the Committee of
Seven Thousand court is one of breath-taking breadth, and promises
to stand Livermore on its head.
Even more startling, however, is the majority's treatment of the
matter as if it were already settled California law. Consequently, a
closer examination of the cases upon which the Committee of Seven
Thousand court relied is warranted.
The first case relied upon by the majority for its "exclusive
delegation" theory was Riedman v. Brison.3 4 In Riedman, voters
circulated an initiative petition calling for a vote on the question of
whether the City of Long Beach should withdraw from the Metro-
politan Water District of Southern California. 35 The Riedman plain-
tiffs, however, only asserted their right to initiative as it arose out
of the charter of the City of Long Beach.'36 The Constitution was
never mentioned, and the Riedman court quite correctly observed
that a legislative action giving the decision exclusively to the governing
bodies of local entities "is superior to and ... controls the charter
provisions. '1 37 This modest assertion is light-years from the assertion
of the Committee of Seven Thousand court that legislative enactments
control over constitutional provisions.
The second case cited by the majority in support of its "exclusive
delegation" theory was Simpson v. Hite." 8 In Simpson the court
considered a statute requiring boards of supervisors to select "suitable
quarters" for superior and municipal courts. 3 9 After the Los Angeles
County Supervisors had selected a site, and entered into substantial
contractual obligations for its construction at that site, an initiative
calling for a different site qualified for the ballot.Y0 Simpson, how-
ever, like Riedman, apparently dealt only with a right of initiative
conferred by a charter, not the Constitution.' 4' Moreover, unlike
Committee of Seven Thousand, in Simpson the basic policy choice,
that courts must have "suitable quarters," had been made by the
legislature. 42 Thus, Simpson is much closer to being a case in which
134. 217 Cal. 383, 18 P.2d 947 (1933).
135. Id. at 385, 18 P.2d at 947.
136. Id. at 386-87, 18 P.2d at 947-48.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. 36 Cal. 2d 125, 222 P.2d 225 (1951).
139. Id. at 127, 222 P.2d at 226.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 129, 222 P.2d at 228.
142. Id.
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the governing body of a local entity lacked any substantial discretion,
and truly was acting as an administrative agency of the state.
143
Finally, the Simpson court went to elaborate lengths to point out
the substantial investment already made by the County in reliance
upon building on the site chosen by the Board of Supervisors.
44
Thus, the traditional rationale for the administrative/legislative dis-
tinction comes into play: the basic policy choice had already been
made, the initiative proponents waited too long.
The third decision cited by the majority in support of its "exclusive
delegation" theory was Geiger v, Board of Supervisors. 45 InGeiger,
the Butte County Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance imposing
a sales and use tax on county residents. Petitioners circulated a
referendum calling for its repeal. 146 The Court disposed of Petitioners'
argument that they had a constitutional right to referend by pointing
out that the Constitution contains an express exception for legislation
"providing for tax levies.' ' 47 The court confined its statutory dis-
cussion entirely to ascertaining whether the legislature intended to
expand upon the constitutional right, and provide for referenda
despite the lack of a constitutional obligation to do sO.' 41 Thus,
Geiger has nothing to do with the issues presented in Committee of
Seven Thousand. Plainly, the subject matter of the initiative in
Committee of Seven Thousand did not fall within any express ex-
ception to the constitutional rights.
In the course of trying to find an "exclusive delegation" theory
in the three cases discussed above, the court attempted to distinguish
Blotter v. Farrell. 49 In Blotter, the court considered an initiative that
sought to require the city council of Palm Springs to reapportion
badly misapportioned city council districts. 50 At that time, Govern-
ment Code section 34871 gave the "legislative body" of local entities
the right to commence the redistricting process.'' With analytical
clarity sorely missing in the Committee of Seven Thousand opinion,
the Blotter court stated that the power to redistrict was "given
directly to the city council and indirectly to the electors under their
143. Id.
144. Id. at 128, 222 P.2d at 227.
145. 48 Cal. 2d 832, 313 P.2d 545 (1957).
146. Id. at 834, 313 P.2d at 546.
147. Id. at 835, 313 P.2d at 547 (quoting former Article IV, section 1).
148. Id, at 837, 313 P.2d at 549.
149. 42 Cal. 2d 804, 270 P.2d 481 (1954).
150. Id. at 806, 270 P.2d at 482.
151. Id. at 809, 270 P.2d at 484 (quoting former California Government Code section 34871).
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initiative powers by the Constitution of California."' 152 Thus the
Blotter court treated as obvious what the Committee of Seven Thou-
sand court struggled so mightily not to see. The right of the local
electorate to stand on a footing equal with their elected local repre-
sentatives is a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and consequently
acts of the state legislature cannot abrogate that right. The Committee
of Seven Thousand court attempted to distinguish Blotter on the
grounds that it involved a "municipal" affair, while the Irvine
initiative impacted matters of "statewide" concern.'53 The Committee
of Seven Thousand majority failed to recognize, however, that the
legislature no more has the power to override the Constitution in
matters of "statewide" concern than it does in matters of "munici-
pal" concern.
An even more telling criticism of the majority's "exclusive dele-
gation" theory, however, is that all the cases relied upon by the
court predate Livermore by almost two decades. In Livermore, the
court finally made clear that the legislature does not have the power
to substantially restrict the rights of direct democracy conferred by
the 1911 amendments. 54 Before Livermore the point was at least
debatable, particularly in light of the court's decision in Hurst v.
City of Burlingame,15 which the Livermore court finally overruled.
In fact, Simpson v. Hite, one of the chief cases relied upon by
Committee of Seven Thousand, cited the since-discredited Hurst
opinion for the proposition that "where a state act specifies the steps
to be taken by a local body in enacting legislation, an initiative
measure cannot be validly adopted unless such steps are taken.' 56
The authority relied upon by the Committee of Seven Thousand
majority is from another era, when the interplay between legislation
and the right of initiative and referendum was less clear. As the
Committee of Seven Thousand court recognized, many of California's
planning laws, which Livermore and its progeny held to be the
subject of popular action, contain language similar to the law that
the court held barred the COST initiative. 57 The majority once again
attempted to explain away this anomaly with its "statewide"/"mu-
152. Id.
153. Committee of Seven Thousand, 45 Cal. 3d at 503, 754 P.2d at 714, 247 Cal. Rptr.
at 368.
154. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
155. 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929).
156. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d at 134, 222 P.2d at 230-31.
157. Committee of Seven Thousand, 45 Cal. 3d at 510-13, 754 P.2d at 720-21, 247 Cal.
Rptr. at 374-75.
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nicipal" distinction.'58 This distinction, however, fares no better than
in other parts of the opinion. The true basis for distinction is that
while the Livermore court recognized the constitutional status of the
initiative and referendum, the Committee of Seven Thousand court
did not.
Committee of Seven Thousand and deBottari thus present unprec-
edented and substantial limitations on the right of local direct de-
mocracy in California. The next part discusses the desirability of
imposing such limitations on local electorate.
III. POLTICAL IMPLICATIONS
As discussed in the previous part, the two major new limitations
on California local initiatives and referenda - the requirements of
general plan consistency and the "exclusive delegation" theory -
are doctrinally unsound. Nevertheless, it may be that the doctrines,
although products of poor legal reasoning, 159 represent good political
policy. This part, however, argues the contrary proposition. The
available empirical data suggest that local initiatives and referenda
have a beneficial effect on political decision-making, and therefore
must not be limited arbitrarily.
Most of the political science and legal literature concentrates on
the effects of statewide initiatives, a political phenomenon that is not
necessarily analogous to local direct democracy1 60 Despite this em-
phasis on statewide direct democracy, substantial data is available
on local politics. Further, some useful comparisons can be drawn to
statewide initiatives and referenda.
Three primary forces distort local representative government. The
first is outright bribery and corruption of local elected representatives,
the second is the effect of campaign contributions on representative
elections, and the third is the politics of "interest groups." Although
the popular view may be that corruption, the first distorting force,
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 86-158 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 16, at 1007-38; Ertukel, supra note 14 (1987); Lee, supra
note 1; Lowenstein, supra note 14; Magleby, Ballot Access for Initiative Petitions and Popular
Referendums: The Importance of Petition Circulation and Signature Validation Procedures, 2
J. oF LAw & PoLrrcs 287 (1987); Price, supra note 2; Radabaugh, Tendencies of California
Direct Legislation, 42 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 66 (1961); Sirico, supra note 14; Zimmerman, supra
note 14; Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of
Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 733 (1988) [hereafter Note, Lousy].
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occurs infrequently, it is a substantial problem.' 6' Local initiatives
and referenda act as a correcting influence on this distorting force.
Most recent initiatives and referenda have related to land development
issues, 6 2 the most fertile source of corruption.'63 In all but the
smallest communities, it is impracticable to purchase directly the
votes of the electorate. Thus, local initiatives and referenda make
decisions less predictable, and spread the authority to a far wider
group than a city council or a county board of supervisors. Thus,
as the Progressives recognized in the early part of the century, direct
democracy short-circuits corruption.
The second major distorting influence on the decision-making of
representative local government is the effect of campaign contribu-
tions on local representatives. The available evidence shows a sub-
stantial correlation between high campaign contributions in races for
local elective office and favorable local decisions for the big spen-
ders.'6 Local initiatives and referenda also correct for this distorting
influence. The heavy campaign contributions in the representative
elections do not buy any advantage in the plebiscite. Further, if it
appears that big spenders in a representative race invested their money
for the sole purpose of obtaining a favorable decision by the gov-
erning body, this may well become a substantial campaign issue if
the decision later winds up in the hands of the electorate. 65
Interest groups are the third major distorting influence on local
representative government. In her comprehensive study, Professor
Zisk examined the decision-making dynamics of eighty-two city coun-
cils in the San Francisco Bay Area.16a The study reveals that the
161. STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE I CORRUPTION IN LAND USE BUILDING REGULATION at
48 (1978); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAv ENFORCEMENT AND CRIM[INAL JUsTICE, I COR.RUPTION
IN LAND USE AND BU DING REGULATION iii, at 39 (1979) (corruption is especially likely in
developing areas); Glenn, State Law Limitations on the Use of Initiatives and Referenda in
Connection with Zoning Amendments, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 265, 265-66 (1978) ("local politicians
have demonstrated parochialism, favoritism, stupidity and greed in regulating land develop-
ment").
162. Borwenger, Land Use Planning By Initiative, 9 L. A. LAW. 43 (Jan. 1987).
163. See supra note 161.
164. STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 161, at 48.
165. Interview with Donald G. Miller, former mayor of Livermore, California (April,
1989); interview with John Stein, former city council member of Livermore, California (April,
1989); interview with Bridget H. Borchers, President, Friends of the Vineyards (April, 1989);
Personal Recollection of Author (hereafter collectively "Interviews") (recalling a successful
1982 hillside protection referendum and a 1989 vineyard protection referendum in Livermore,
California in which referendum proponents pointed out the heavy contributions of developers
to campaign funds of city council members voting in favor of general plan amendments
relaxing hillside development standards).
166. B. Zisic, LOCAL INTEREST PoLrncs: A ONE-AVAY STREET (1973).
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influences on local elected representatives are extremely complex and
varied. Distinct, cohesive political groups, which Professor Zisk calls
"interest groups," heavily influence approximately one-half of elected
local representatives. The influence that these groups achieve varies,
but does not appear to depend upon any one factor that easily can
be termed democratic. 167 Rather, the strength of the interest group
influence varies with some democratic factors, such as voting strength
and size, and other undemocratic factors, such as economic power.
6 8
The precise effect of direct democracy on this interplay is impossible
to evaluate accurately without a study as comprehensive as Professor
Zisk's. Nonetheless, direct democracy has the effect of bringing into
the political arena interest groups entirely left out of the local
representative democratic process. 169 By drawing previously disen-
franchised groups, direct democracy furthers the goal of broad
political participation. Thus, although the picture lacks perfect clarity,
local initiatives and referenda probably have a beneficial effect on
the dynamics of interest group influence.
Moreover, there may be other beneficial effects to local direct
democracy besides correcting for distorting influences. Critics have
increasingly attacked the California statewide initiative process as a
tool of specialized interests in which the more heavily-financed side
wins.170 Nevertheless, the institution of statewide initiatives has its
vigorous defenders.'1 ' However, the view that the statewide initiative
is a process in which the big spenders always win is not entirely
accurate. In his comprehensive study of statewide initiatives, Profes-
sor Lowenstein pointed out that big money can defeat a statewide
initiative, but it usually cannot pass one. 72
Even this limited effect, however, may be less prevalent in local
ballot measures. Although a more comprehensive study is called for,
one city with an active history of direct democracy provides a useful
starting point for analysis. Livermore, California, is a city of ap-
proximately 50,000 residents located forty miles southeast of San
Francisco. 73 Since 1972, Livermore has voted on two popularly-
167. Id. at 19-25.
168. Id.
169. Deutsch, supra note 60, at 35; Stone, Local Referendums: An Alternative to the
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originated initiatives and two referenda, all dealing with land-use
issues. 174
The first measure was the 1972 SAVE initiative, which was the
subject of the California Supreme Court's opinion in Associated
Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore,7 1
discussed earlier in this article. The SAVE initiative prohibited the
issuance of building permits until the City met minimum standards
for sewage disposal, educational facilities and water reserves. 76 De-
velopment interests, and a majority of the city council, vigorously
opposed the SAVE initiative. 177 Out spent by a ratio of more than
ten to one, initiative proponents nevertheless won with fifty-five
percent of the vote, largely due to a group of approximately one
hundred volunteers distributing hand bills door to door and making
personal telephone calls. 178
The second measure was a 1982 referendum to overturn various
general plan amendments, made by the city council, relaxing hillside
development restrictions. 179 The prime beneficiary of this relaxation
was a developer seeking to build sixty-five high-priced custom homes
on the hillsides separating Livermore from the freeway passing by
the city. 180 Development interests, once again, vigorously opposed the
referendum.' Out spent $16,000 to $1,200, a ratio of approximately
thirteen to one, referendum proponents succeeded with the same
strategy as the SAVE proponents: deploying a large number of
volunteers to knock on doors. 182 By a margin of fifty-four percent
to forty-six percent, Livermore voters rejected relaxations on hillside
development. 18
3
174. Interviews, supra note 165. Livermore also has had two referenda that have not gone
to votes. In 1979, the city council increased the maximum residential lot coverage for new
homes, but decreased the maximum coverage for the expansion of existing homes. Referendum
proponents circulated a petition, arguing that it was a windfall to developers and decreased
neighborhood stability. After the petition was certified by the city clerk as containing enough
signatures to qualify the ballot, the council exercised its option to repeal the ordinance. In
1985 the city council voted to remove from the mayor the power to appoint city commission
members, and vest it in the council. After a petition to referend this ordinance qualified, the
council backed down. This referendum was unusual because the traditional roles were reversed.
Fared with the first slow-growth city council in several years, development sources used direct
democracy to come to the aid of the city's pro-development mayor.
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The third measure was a 1986 initiative seeking to require a public
vote before the city could enter into a joint powers agreement to
fund a massive regional sewage pipeline. 184 Development interests,
eager to expand regional sewage capacity, vigorously opposed the
initiative.'85 Spending was increased dramatically from 1982; initiative
proponents were out spent $71,000 to $4,000, a ratio of eighteen to
one. This time the big money overcame the grassroots strategy, and
the voters defeated the initiative fifty-one percent to forty-nine per-
cent.18
6
The fourth measure was a 1989 referendum to repeal zoning
ordinances allowing high-priced custom homes on potential vineyard
land. Out spent by development interests by the astonishing margin
of $160,000 to $6,000, a ratio of twenty-seven to one, the grassroots
strategy returned to its winning ways. 8 7 By a margin of fifty-one
percent to forty-nine percent, 188 Livermore voters rejected the devel-
opments.18 9
Thus, in three out of four instances, Livermore voters rejected
development interests. These rejections came despite increasing spend-
ing by development interests and a city council that more often than
not was aligned with the builders and developers?1 ' Perhaps the
general lessons that can be drawn from the Livermore experience are
limited, but it illustrates a simple point. Local initiatives and refer-
enda are a more truly grassroots phenomenon than statewide initia-
tives. Communities such as Livermore are small enough to allow for
effective campaigning with almost no economic resources. Logistics
make conducting such a campaign at the state level nearly impossible.
Finally, direct democracy may well have beneficial effects on the
quality of representative democracy. States in which the electorate
employs statewide initiatives frequently have legislatures that rate
higher on standard measures of "accountability" and "effective-
ness." 9' One possible explanation for this correlation is that legis-
lators who are aware of the possibility of popular action in the face
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though, as discussed above, statewide and local direct democracy are
not precisely parallel, there is no reason to believe that their interplay
with representative democracy is radically different.
All this is not to suggest that local direct democracy is not without
its critics. One group of commentators has criticized land-use direct
democracy for having an "exclusionary effect" on low income and
minority groups. 193 These commentaries, however, do not cite any
empirical data that support their assertion that local electorates are
more exclusionary in their land-use decisions than local politicians.
In Livermore, for instance, the two referenda since 1972 were directed
at high-priced, custom-lot residential developments. 194 Thus, in Liv-
ermore, the electorate has been engaged in the antithesis of exclu-
sionary zoning. Even if local direct democracy does have an
exclusionary effect, the solution does not lie in the broad limitations
developed by the California courts in the 1980's. Rather, an appro-
priate solution would be to insulate some amount of low and mod-
erate income development from referendum.
Another group of commentators makes the more general complaint
that direct democracy, including local direct democracy, is an exercise
of "raw" or "tyrannical" majoritarianism. 19 This argument is harder
to deflect, in part because it is circular. The choice between a purely
representative democracy, and a democracy that mixes direct and
representative components, is ultimately a debate over political mo-
rality. Debates over political morality and theory are insoluble at a
certain level because resolution requires agreement with respect to
the "best" way to govern, which is a highly subjective inquiry. Thus,
criticizing direct democracy for allowing a "tyranny" of the majority
presupposes that there is something "wrong" with majority rule.
9 6
Even by its own terms, however, the "majority tyranny" criticism
is overblown. Elected representatives are placed in, and removed
from, office by the majority. Accordingly, representative democracy
is only slightly less majoritarian in nature. The most important check
on majority rule is judicial constitutional review, a check that applies
equally to direct and representative decisions.
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More importantly, however, this article defends local direct de-
mocracy on limited grounds. The available data demonstrates that
persons and entities willing to devote their large economic resources
to local politics can, and do, increase the chances of local represen-
tative decisions favorable to them. These expenditures help big-
spending persons and entities either directly, through bribery of local
officials, or indirectly, through campaign contributions or enhanced
status for their interest groups. This Part argues that local direct
democracy is desirable because it corrects for the distorting influence
of wealth and willingness to spend wealth on local politics. This
argument presupposes the proposition that these distortions should
be corrected for, and that wealthy persons and entities ought not be
able to tip the scales in their favor. The proposition that government
ought to treat equally all persons, regardless of economic status and
willingness to invest economic resources in local politics, may or may
not be self-evident. But self-evident or not, it lies close to the heart
of American democracy. 98 Judged against this set of values, there-
fore, the new and broad limitations on California local direct de-
mocracy are bad political policy.
CONCLUSION
California local direct democracy was a product of the Progressive
movement. It culminated in the constitutional embodiment of the
rights of recall, initiate and referendum in the 1911 constitutional
amendments. Courts interpreting these amendments generally placed
legislative bodies and the electorate on an equal footing. The scope
of judicial interpretation of these rights peaked around 1980, and
since then the California courts have imposed a succession of limi-
tations. The two most important limitations, the requirement of
consistency with the general plan, and the "exclusive delegation"
theory, are the product of badly flawed legal reasoning. Moreover,
while the data is not complete, the available empirical evidence
suggests that substantial limitations on the right of local initiative
and referendum are indefensible from a political perspective.
198. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).

